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The public sector reforms of  the 1980s were an important 
catalyst for the revitalisation of  the national economy 
at that time, in retrospect perhaps more because of  the 
opportunity they generated to rethink longstanding practices 
and structures, than because of  the qualities of  the new 
public management model that was the central focus of  the 
changes. With government expenditure accounting for 45% 
of  GDP, and few options for managing the huge increases 
anticipated in health, retirement provision and justice, the 
need for revitalisation is just as strong today as it was 25 years 
ago.
The aim of  this paper is to highlight the potential for 
sustained increases in innovation and transformation of  
systems in the public sector through effective leadership of  
the most critical value chains, in health, education, science, 
justice and social services. Sustainable quality improvement 
and transformation requires innovation supported by 
insightful, informed leadership and far-sighted engineering of  
complex systems and processes. Significantly and sustainably 
improving value for money from the public sector will require 
redesigning large, sector-wide service delivery value chains 
from end to end, and making strategic shifts in the resource 
base, systems and mandate of  organisations. 
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Introduction 
The new, National-led government is seeking a significant lift in productivity 
and economic growth. Raising the performance of  the public sector is 
central to achieving such an objective. In our view, improving public sector 
performance is unlikely if  we rely solely on the management tools and 
approaches introduced some 20 years ago. Nor will periodic budget cuts 
and reductions in ‘back office’ resources result in the level of  improvement 
desired (Cook and Hughes, 2009). Rather, the focus should be on how the 
public sector can stimulate innovation and economic transformation through 
its critical role as the leader of  several large, pervasive value chains,2 such as 
health, education, science, justice and social services.
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Approach
The area of  interest in this paper is government-owned 
organisations that deliver public services. This includes 
ministries and departments, the non-public service 
departments such as the New Zealand Police and New 
Zealand Defence forces, and Crown entities including the 
district health boards (DHBs).3 All public sector entities have 
a responsible minister, or, in a number of  cases, multiple 
ministers. 
At an institutional level oversight of  these entities is 
provided by the ‘central agencies’, namely the Treasury, 
State Services Commission (SSC) and the Office of  the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). The three central 
agencies work closely together, and initiatives to increase 
this cooperation have been expanded since the review of  
coordination among the central agencies in 2006. Outside of  
this arrangement, the Office of  the Controller and Auditor 
General, as an officer of  Parliament, plays an important role 
in addressing issues of  accountability for value for money 
within the public sector. 
Against this background, the question we have asked 
ourselves is why, with the institutional and governance 
structures in place, the high degree of  short-term monitoring 
of  public sector organisations by central agencies, and the 
analysis that takes place in the public policy agencies, are 
there such persistent difficulties in achieving high value-for-
money public services? Our experience, from working in and 
with public sector entities, is that an important source of  
inefficiency is the inadequate attention given to leadership 
of  the major public service value chains, and the oversight 
of  that leadership. Poor leadership in service delivery value 
chains can dramatically reduce value for money, create 
resistance to systemic change that would bring productivity 
and quality improvements over time, and stifle the adoption 
of  new opportunities for improvement in the quality and 
quantity of  outputs. 
In the complex sectors of  health, justice, education and 
welfare, the value chains involve multiple organisations, yet 
we are not aware of  any attempt to measure the degree of  
fragmentation in leadership in public service value chains, or 
the quality of  leadership over them. For example, oversight 
and leadership of  the network of  parties which make up the 
public health value chain does not appear to be recognised 
within the governance roles and structure of  the public health 
sector. We have only the proxy measure of  New Zealand’s 
poor record in increasing productivity (The Treasury, 2005). 
Overall, it is New Zealand’s place in the world that is vital 
to us, and in comparative terms we continue to slip (The 
Treasury, 2008). This most vital benchmark of  our position 
in the world highlights the consequences of  poor productivity, 
but gives little diagnostic indication. 
Without insightful and effective leadership of  the large 
value chains involved in the delivery of  some public services, 
fragmentation in leadership can result in variable service 
quality and increased costs. To illustrate this, we have 
considered two inputs to the public health value chain;4 
one is an example of  integrated leadership and the other of  
uncoordinated and devolved, fragmented leadership. The 
procurement of  pharmaceuticals is provided as an example 
of  a streamlined system with effective leadership across this 
part of  the value chain, while the training of  the medical 
workforce is used as the example of  a highly fragmented 
approach, which has been subject to considerable attention 
at ministerial level since 2007 because of  this, with strong 
value chain leadership finally being proposed only recently.
We believe that the findings of  this analysis reflect issues 
with value chain leadership or its absence across the New 
Zealand public sector. Along with observations from other 
fields, these findings are also proposed as a basis from which 
to formulate a strategic approach to driving value-for-money 
improvements from public services. 
Medical workforce training: a highly fragmented approach
The training of  the medical workforce in New Zealand 
follows a widely adopted model in which graduates trained 
at recognised universities progress through prescribed 
training programmes to gain registration with the industry 
body, the Medical Council of  New Zealand. Vocationally-
trained medical specialists including general practitioners 
are employed as senior medical officers (SMOs) primarily in 
DHBs, the providers of  hospital services, and in providing 
health services funded through the DHBs, for example 
in general practice. In addition to New Zealand-trained 
SMOs and general practitioners (GPs), an important source 
of  SMOs is from overseas, and these people make up for 
the undersupply of  medical graduates from New Zealand 
universities who remain in the New Zealand workforce. 
In 2008, 6,446 doctors and doctors in training were New 
Zealand medical school graduates and 4,106 were overseas 
medical school graduates (Medical Council of  New Zealand, 
2009).
... there is no role in the health system for strong leadership across the DHB 
network, yet the Medical Training Board (2009) reports huge shifts in the size 
and age mix of DHB populations which will place the viability of many services 
at risk if they continue to be operated separately on a DHB specific basis.
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Centralising the evaluation and purchase of medicines has enabled the 
development of specialist competencies, which arguably could not be 
maintained by DHBs evaluating and purchasing medicines individually.
Of  the total expenditure of  $15.4 billion on health care 
in 2006, 78% was through the public health system, with the 
balance being private expenditure (District Health Boards 
New Zealand, 2009). The public expenditure is delivered 
through 21 DHBs. DHBs in turn fund GPs to deliver some 
services. There is a remarkable range in size between the 
smallest DHB and the largest. The smallest, in terms of  the 
number of  SMOs and doctors in training, is the West Coast 
DHB with 30, and the largest is Auckland DHB with 1,079 
(Medical Council of  New Zealand, 2009). Whilst there is a 
well-established process in place for training medical staff, 
under the current institutional arrangements there is a 
significant discrepancy in the ability of  different DHBs to 
participate in that process.  
For example, in most fields of  medicine there is no clear 
strategy for national or regional service delivery, apart from 
some specifically designated national services, often based in 
Auckland or another of  the largest DHBs.5 Size matters in 
being able to develop and maintain a clinical speciality, making 
it very difficult, even impossible for some DHBs to maintain 
the critical mass of  staff  necessary to satisfactorily undertake 
clinical services. In particular, they struggle to sustain training 
positions at registrar level, with follow-on implications 
for the recruitment at SMO level. Even if  more funding 
was available, the potential patient base for many medical 
conditions would be insufficient to prevent huge differences 
in the quality of  care, when the relevance of  experience 
of  medical staff  is taken into account. Apart from smaller 
DHBs in places where lifestyle benefits are well recognised 
(Nelson and Hawke’s Bay), most stand-alone clinical services 
in small DHBs have a very high turnover of  SMOs, with 
consequent effects on service availability, leadership capacity 
and innovation. While there are examples of  adjacent DHBs 
establishing collaborative arrangements (Southland and 
Otago, the West Coast and Nelson, and the central region 
DHBs) there has been no capacity to systematically set out a 
strategy for regional service delivery in the long-term interest 
of  providing relevant national public health service. 
As previously noted, there is no role in the health system 
for strong leadership across the DHB network, yet the Medical 
Training Board (2009) reports huge shifts in the size and 
age mix of  DHB populations which will place the viability 
of  many services at risk if  they continue to be operated 
separately on a DHB specific basis. A recent commission 
appointed by the director-general of  health also highlighted 
this concern in its recommendations.6 
Many critical decisions about the health workforce have 
been made without relevant information. It is only recently 
that in-depth information about doctors in training has 
been made available (by the Medical Training Board and 
District Health Boards New Zealand) in a form which might 
be used to develop informed approaches to more effectively 
managing the training of  one of  the country’s most critical 
professional workforces. This is at a time when New Zealand 
will be doubling the number of  medical graduates and 
without managed training there is a high risk of  losing more 
of  this highly mobile group.
Protecting the conditions under which doctors in training 
work has been a longstanding concern, and what goodwill 
existed in the past was severely undermined by poorly managed 
employment relations during the 1990s, characterised by the 
imposition of  managerialism which undervalued clinical 
operational knowledge. As a consequence of  this loss of  
goodwill, employment arrangements for doctors in training 
have become more highly formalised. The breakdown in 
trust has expanded the content of  industrial agreements, and 
similar tends are occurring for senior doctors. There are two 
industrial organisations representing doctors in the DHB 
system, the New Zealand Resident Doctors Association and 
the Association of  Salaried Medical Specialists. 
A diversity of  local management responses to a chronic 
national doctor shortage has led to the pay on temporary 
locum posts rising so much that a large number of  doctors 
in training have opted for this and chosen to delay entry into 
vocational training. This has reduced the number of  doctors 
in training in some areas below a critical mass to maintain 
the training in that speciality in a number of  hospitals. 
SMOs have a similar degree of  dissatisfaction, although the 
cause differs.
Over a lengthy period of  significant budget surpluses, it 
has been politically less costly to maintain the status quo than 
to change how the medical training system operates. We 
now have a clear strategy to shift from a highly fragmented 
approach to the training of  future SMOs. While the sector 
has, in areas, demonstrated a huge capacity to change, it is 
only recently that a decision has been taken to address the 
obvious problems with the medical training system. 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency: a streamlined approach
In contrast to the fragmented approach to training doctors, 
the acquisition of  drugs is a streamlined process, managed 
across the health sector value chain. The essential step 
in streamlining this process was the creation of  the 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency, Pharmac. It was set 
up in 1993 as a joint venture company owned by the four 
regional health authorities for drug purchasing. Pharmac is 
now a Crown entity responsible to the minister of  health, 
and has the twin tasks of  making arrangements for access 
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to medicines and promoting the optimal use of  medicines. 
It does this by managing the pharmaceutical budgets for the 
DHBs and evaluating which medicines should be funded 
by government. As the centralised pharmaceutical agency, 
Pharmac also assists DHBs to assess the cost effectiveness of  
new medicines. In 2009 the total expenditure on prescription 
drugs was $635 million. Medicines are manufactured by 
private sector companies and a detailed understanding of  
the market for the supply of  drugs is vital to being able to 
operate effectively as a purchasing agent.
Centralising the evaluation and purchase of  medicines 
has enabled the development of  specialist competencies, 
which arguably could not be maintained by DHBs evaluating 
and purchasing medicines individually. Coordinating the 
purchase of  all medicines across the DHB network has also 
enabled the health sector to take advantage of  its size, using 
the combined purchasing power of  the DHBs to reduce 
costs. Importantly, the streamlining of  pharmaceutical 
purchasing has enabled Pharmac to take an active role in 
educating consumers in the use of  some medicines, especially 
antibiotics. Pharmac is active at three points in the value 
chain: evaluation, purchasing and education about the use 
of  medicines.
What does this tell us about institutional structure and value 
for money?
The processes for training medical staff  and purchasing 
medicines are both complex, but markedly different 
approaches have been taken, with one fragmented and 
devolved and the other integrated, with centralised leadership. 
These two examples illustrate two different approaches 
to acquiring inputs; clearly there are a range of  other 
approaches that could be taken to managing other aspects of  
the health sector value chain. What these examples highlight 
are the advantages of  taking an integrated approach, not just 
to realising value for money but to facilitating stakeholder 
engagement, including, if  relevant, public education and 
debate. This will not be possible without leadership and 
oversight across the major components of  public sector value 
chains.
In summary, our analysis highlights that:
1 There are complex service delivery value chains associated with 
many public services. Fragmentation in complex value chains 
has negative performance ramifications for all involved in 
the delivery of  public services. Fragmentation can result 
in a significant reduction in value to consumers and it is 
disempowering for those working in the sector because it 
is too difficult to make changes to the system. From the 
perspective of  the entire value chain, fragmentation results 
in: (1) diminished opportunities to build a critical mass 
of  expertise, bringing not only inertia but also building 
barriers to innovation and service delivery improvement; 
(2) forgone opportunities of  economies of  size and other 
means of  gaining economic advantage; and (3) a larger 
burden of  bureaucratic oversight obligations that come as 
expensive substitutes for standards and systems. Achieving 
sustained value for money from these public services will 
require leadership focused across an entire value chain 
(including the various inputs, transformation systems and 
outputs).
2 These service delivery value chains are strongly dynamic, and 
imposing rigidities on them through fragmentation in value chain 
leadership has a significant impact on innovation, adaptability and 
dynamic efficiency. There is a narrow and rigid approach to 
role and structure which is presented as a choice on a rigid 
continuum which ranges from government department to 
Crown agency through to SOE. Associated with this is an 
over-simplification of  the market/public sector boundary 
which is seen as a preparedness for privatisation, this being 
indicated by where an entity is placed on this continuum. 
More signs of  the excessive focus on institutional 
structures comes from the creation of  artificial markets 
and fragmentation of  value chains, sometimes as a 
consequence of  the so-called funder/provider split, 
when one agency allocates the resources applied by other 
government entities at various stages of  the value chain. 
A consequence of  this excessive focus on institutional 
structures and of  assigning the allocation of  resources 
to agencies that do not have a deep understanding and 
leadership role across the value chains they fund is that 
the public sector has become detached from the reality 
of  what is required to make New Zealand’s public sector 
globally competitive. This detachment is manifested 
through excessive reliance on departmental outputs as 
a central indicator of  performance, without regard for 
markets or systems, nor even the appropriateness of  
the end services delivered by public sector value chains. 
The creation of  fictional markets to support atomised 
contestability, and relationships focused on financial 
contracts and compliance obligations, has reduced the 
ability of  entities to respond to changing circumstances. 
3 Current institutional structures, legal authorities and budget 
delegations do not facilitate, and in some cases prohibit, the 
effective value chain leadership necessary to bring about sustained 
improvements in value for money in the provision of  public services. 
Value chain leadership requires clear acknowledgement 
Value chain leadership requires clear acknowledgement that one authority has 
the mandate to gather information and engage in establishing a systems-wide 
view of the sector that they are part of.
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that one authority has the mandate to gather information 
and engage in establishing a systems-wide view of  the 
sector that they are part of. How this mandate is allocated 
and overseen may well need to be unique to the sector, as 
will the partners engaged in this work. Given the depth 
of  concern about public sector performance, in the 
context of  policy failings about productivity in the wider 
economy, delays in obtaining such a mandate should not 
prevent leadership initiatives within the public sector itself. 
We would also comment that, in our view, the policy/
operations split has contributed to the current state of  
affairs. With the policy/operations split there has been 
a massive loss of  information and increase in ignorance 
about the nature, direction and ongoing operation of  our 
major public sector value chains. 
4 To lift service quality and improve value for money, it is certain 
that in any complex sector there will be some key standards or 
systems and it will be essential to have the mechanisms to oblige all 
institutions within a particular public sector system to adopt them. 
The breadth and scale of  internal production by formerly 
large government departments was extensive, but value 
chain leadership (or managing co-production) was simply 
not recognised before or after 1988 as an activity vital 
to dynamic and allocative efficiency that would add 
value, drive productivity gains and stimulate innovation. 
Even worse was the failure to identify anywhere the 
increased significance of  effective value chain leadership 
in capitalising on the rise of  global and national services 
and infrastructure. In New Zealand, 97% of  GPs 
have electronic patient records and the capability to 
electronically deliver diagnostic information (compared 
to 25% of  GPs in the USA), and yet the public health 
system has failed to put in place a common New Zealand-
wide patient management system, or even common 
capacity for readily obtaining and exchanging diagnostic 
information, such as x-rays, across all centres. Concepts 
of  core competencies and critical mass have slipped by 
unnoticed by the central agencies in New Zealand. The 
functional organisational form and contractual focus 
of  the New Zealand reforms of  the 1980s provided no 
vehicle, informal or otherwise, for ensuring common 
approaches to matters where an integrated approach 
across government entities could offer economies of  
scope or scale or efficiency gains.
There are also spill-over effects on other sectors. For 
example, those working outside the public sector are often 
required to emulate the bureaucratic processes of  the public 
sector. The voluntary sector,7 for example, has experienced 
two decades of  working with higher compliance costs brought 
about by extensively detailed but poorly evaluated contracts. 
The result has been that the sector itself  has increasingly 
loaded more administrative demands onto its front-line 
workers by centralising minor decision making and imposing 
additional compliance obligations. This has reduced for 
some the spontaneity and community service elements of  
voluntary work.
An inflexible attitude on the part of  public sector 
entities which advances their own, and not sector-wide, 
objectives also engenders a high degree of  caution amongst 
potential collaborators on the public/private/voluntary 
sector boundary. The uncertainty that this type of  caution 
engenders makes it difficult for the private and voluntary 
sectors to justify investment to build new capacity (both 
human and physical). This reduces participation by the 
private and voluntary sectors and shifts the burden for new 
investment onto the public sector. The impact of  this over 
time is for the public sector to reduce the strength of  other 
potential collaborators in the delivery of  public services.
The current structure of  the New Zealand public sector 
does not provide authority to any entity or body to make 
governance decisions at a sector level, and, importantly, to 
lead implementation of  those decisions, despite it being at 
this cross-sector level that leadership is most necessary if  
we are to make serious gains in lifting value for money and 
service quality. 
At the political management level, the ministerial 
portfolio mix in New Zealand is almost always scattered, 
poorly linked and unable to provide a concerted focus on 
the delivery of  outcomes. The capacity that ministers have 
to reach agreement becomes absolutely critical when there is 
no serious consideration given to how decisions within related 
ministerial portfolios should be aligned. This system is highly 
dependent on ministerial competence and predilections. 
Ministers have increasingly become active project sponsors, 
without the consequent expense of  accepting the breadth of  
governance relevant to the significance of  their decisions. 
All of  this narrows the interest and capacity to focus on 
sector-wide issues, where success is likely to enhance the 
performance of  your successor and being accountable 
for large-scale developments with high-risk profiles brings 
career risks, especially if  the trust needed in public sector 
leaders is still developing. Compounding this is the political 
dimension to value-perception by ministers, which is driven 
by considerations of  their own understanding of  and position 
on issues, and political advantage.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 introduced disciplined 
procedures for the governance of  government appropriations, 
set out in the annual government budget. No equivalent 
exists for the specification and monitoring of  government 
outcomes. This absence of  a nationally-agreed outcome 
strategy has had a number of  ramifications:
There is no independent commentator on the value for money from public 
services.
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Ministers as purchase agents do not necessarily recognise 
the less tangible accountability of  each chief  executive to be 
prepared for future governments or emerging problems.
There is a growing tendency for senior leaders in the 
public sector to be working in isolated and autonomous 
roles, and sometimes possibly advocating that they be given 
responsibility for sector leadership.
There is no independent commentator on the value for 
money from public services. The Treasury and SSC may 
have the mandate but, as part of  the public sector, they are 
not independent parties. The Office of  the Controller and 
Auditor General will investigate specific instances where 
authorities and procedures have not been adhered to. 
To begin to redress this will require highly-informed 
central agencies, more effective understanding of  systems and 
value chains by policy agencies, and much richer and more 
challenging interrelationships among all parties involved. The 
strong collaboration we now see among the central agencies 
may perversely strengthen tacit acceptance of  the continued 
relevance of  the approach adopted to public sector reform 
in the 1980s. Indeed, intense central agency collaboration 
and interdependence may well diminish contestability and 
challenge within these bodies.
A new set of rules
The managing-for-outcomes framework could have been 
a valuable achievement. However, current governance 
structures focus on chief  executive accountability for the 
delivery of  individual agency outputs in the absence of  an 
accountability framework for sector-level outcomes and value 
chain leadership. 
To address these shortcomings we have identified in this 
article will require:
1 Broadening governance structures and practices to 
encompass sector-wide solutions to outcomes. This 
requires both rethinking the performance management 
framework to give weight to value chain efficiency, and an 
entirely different and demanding approach to assessing 
outcomes.
2 Simplifying the major public sector service delivery value 
chains, centralising functions where appropriate, and 
continually striving to improve value for money in the 
delivery of  outcomes. This requires identifying the key 
public service value chains and putting in place the means 
for their active leadership and oversight. 
3 Changing public sector culture and incentives to work 
in alliances with other organisations in the private and 
voluntary sectors. This requires the active management 
of  boundaries, which may see more work outsourced.
More effective sector-wide leadership could result from 
refocusing roles in the public sector institutional structure, 
without major structural change. This could be achieved by, 
first, establishing accountability for the delivery of  a national 
agenda of  outcomes – this is one of  the two new roles we 
are proposing. We envisage that there could be between 
five and ten national outcomes established by government, 
covering the whole of  the public sector, each with a set of  
supporting goals and performance indicators. Each national 
outcome would have an outcome leader with responsibility 
for working with key players to define the most appropriate 
service delivery value chain, set of  players and role for each 
player. 
These value chains would consist of  a mix of  public sector 
entities and private and voluntary sector entities. Operational 
responsibility for how the players work together would remain 
with the public sector delivery entity (for example, the DHBs 
and Pharmac). 
The outcome leader would not be the chief  executive 
of  one of  the delivery entities but would be a specially 
appointed role. Administratively, outcome leaders could be 
located within DPMC, but would take their mandate from 
the responsible minister. 
Coordination of  outcomes and management of  the 
contribution made by public sector entities would be provided 
by a national outcome forum. This forum would consist of  
the national outcome leaders and the heads of  the SSC and 
Treasury. 
The state services commissioner would chair the forum as 
head of  the public service, an extension to the current role. 
An extension to the commissioner’s role would be necessary 
to provide the mandate for a focus on performance at sector 
and not just individual chief  executive and agency level, and 
to coordinate activities across public sector entities. 
In assessing outcome performance, the responsible 
minister(s) would consider the contribution made by all 
players in the value chains. The strategy for the achievement 
of  outcomes and the role of  the participants in the sector 
value chain would be set out in an outcome transformation 
plan. The outcome leader would be tasked with facilitating 
the process of  developing the outcome plan in collaboration 
with key players in the value chain and in consultation with 
stakeholders, including New Zealanders and service users.
To contribute effectively to the forum, the Treasury would 
need to broaden its capability to assess the value for money 
from value chains involved in the delivery of  outcomes. The 
Treasury would need an understanding not only of  outcome 
and output performance but also of  the transformation 
systems and inputs for the major public sector value chains in 
health, education, science, justice and social services.
Whilst there is a well-established process in place for training medical staff, 
under the current institutional arrangements there is a significant discrepancy in 
the ability of different DHBs to participate in that process. 
Page 62 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 5, Issue 4 – November 2009
We propose an additional new role be established, that 
of  an independent national productivity commission. 
The purpose of  this body would be to examine and make 
recommendations on the efficiency and effectiveness of  the 
major public service delivery value chains.8 It would report 
to a responsible minister with whom its work plan would be 
agreed. The reports of  the commission would be published.
Under this model there would be no change to the role of  
the controller and auditor general.
Discussion
This post-bureaucratic organisational form recognises the 
unique features of  public sector entities as well as utilising 
private and voluntary organisations to deliver government 
outcomes. An important way in which this new form 
of  organisation differs from that currently found in the 
New Zealand public service is the active management of  
the dynamic boundaries between the roles played by all 
participants in public service delivery. These boundaries are 
managed and facilitated by the public sector. 
Improved analytical capabilities and information will be 
needed in order to realise benefits from transformation in the 
major service delivery value chains. The  information needed 
is not only related to organisational performance but also 
covers activities which constitute the service delivery value 
chain and its participants, the nature of  input and output 
markets, and insights into how these markets might evolve. 
External evaluations with a sector-wide focus can play a 
vital role in challenging the status quo and counterbalancing 
short-term agency-level output measures which are used to 
assess public sector performance.
Changes of  the type we describe would also put an end 
in many cases to the split between policy and operations, 
see consolidated processes in some cases, require improved 
governance arrangements and spell an end to the artificial 
competition that has been part of  the justification for the 
fragmentation of  sectors, most noticeably the public health 
sector. The funder/provider splits also need to be revisited. 
Interestingly, the use of  purchase advisors by the current 
National-led government could be seen as the embryonic 
development of  the formal role of  outcome leaders we are 
proposing.
There are also numerous examples from New Zealand 
of  the use of  commissions and boards to provide advice on 
specific matters: for example, electricity, telecommunications, 
retirement, film and medical training. Over the period 
1977 to 1991 an advisory body, the New Zealand Planning 
Council, operated with a cross-sector mandate to advise 
government on economic, social and cultural planning. In 
July 2009 a productivity taskforce was appointed to identify 
how New Zealand can close the income gap with Australia 
by 2025. Other taskforces have also been appointed to look 
at improving productivity in specific sectors, such as the 
Building and Construction Sector Productivity Taskforce 
established in 2008. 
Summary and conclusion
The public sector has long been recognised as operating in 
a network with other organisations, including those in the 
private and voluntary sectors. The public sector reforms of  
the 1980s clarified the outputs that were to be delivered by 
public sector institutions, and privatised many government-
owned and -managed activities. In this article we have 
put forward the proposition that the poor performance 
of  the public sector is a result of  widespread and systemic 
fragmentation in leadership of  key value chains which 
support the provision of  public services in complex sectors of  
government. We argue that streamlining sector-wide value 
chains will address recognised deficiencies in the current 
arrangements and drive improvements in value for money in 
the delivery of  public services. We also argue that operating 
within collaborative network structures is more appropriate 
for a small, open economy, like New Zealand’s. 
Making greater use of  networks and collaborative 
arrangements would require no fundamental changes in 
the legislative framework within which the public sector 
operates. Simple institutional structures need to be put in 
place to provide the governance to drive the adoption of  
practices for continuous improvement and value-for-money 
gains. We have advocated that this could be achieved through 
the creation of  two new bodies and honing the roles of  the 
SSC and Treasury. The new bodies are the national outcome 
forum to provide leadership in lifting value for money from 
public services, and an independent national productivity 
commission for monitoring the actual gains achieved.
Collaborative network arrangements seek to capitalise 
on the limited capabilities available in New Zealand and 
in so doing gain economies, and allocate risk and capital to 
the parties best able to manage them. An example of  the 
economic gains that can be realised from taking an integrated 
approach to managing across a major public sector value 
chain was provided by the centralised drug-buying activities 
of  Pharmac. In a country of  four million people facing 
severe economic conditions, there are few justifications for 
the public sector not pushing hard to gain the full benefits 
from better exploitation of  the limited capabilities available. 
Despite what seem to us clear benefits from operating 
within a more systematic network structure, we would 
Collaborative network arrangements seek to capitalise on the limited 
capabilities available in New Zealand and in so doing gain economies, and 
allocate risk and capital to the parties best able to manage them. 
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caution that unless these structures are part of  a redesign 
of  the entire service delivery value chain with appropriate 
governance structures, the high costs of  coordination and 
monitoring may make networks unworkable. 
Addressing issues of  governance, critical mass, leverage 
of  assets and core nationwide systems, and an informed 
collective view of  the future context, are seen as central 
elements of  public sector leadership which will be critical to 
improving the value for money realised from public services in 
New Zealand. Addressing these issues will provide important 
tests of  all policies and programmes, including decisions 
by ministers and central agencies. Unless these issues are 
addressed then the plethora of  old and new approaches we 
will undoubtedly see brought to bear on the public sector will 
have little more effect than as rallying calls for change. 
Most critically, the central agencies who are accountable 
for the public sector management system need to show 
how we are moving from the solutions of  the past, given 
that our economic position has so painfully continued to 
decline under their stewardship. This matters because the 
performance of  the public sector is inextricably tied to New 
Zealand’s future.
1 We are grateful to Jonathan Boston, James Olson, Colin Lynch and an anonymous 
referee for their helpful comments. We would especially like to thank Megan Bray for her 
assistance.
2 A value chain is a network of capabilities which culminate in the capacity to deliver goods 
and services.
3 These agencies cover the departments listed in schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1989 
(the ministries and departments), the executive branch non-public service departments 
such as Police and Defence, and the district health boards (DHBs), which are listed in the 
first schedule of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.  In addition there 
are agencies listed on the 4th schedule of the Public Finance Act 1989 and in schedules 1 
and 2 of the Crown Entities Act 2004.
4 Our concern in this article is with the negative impacts that high fragmentation in the entire 
service delivery value chain can have on the value for money and quality of public services. 
Our comments should not be taken as implying that we are necessarily arguing for larger 
institutions. Decisions of the most appropriate size of institutions would need individual 
analysis.
5 The plastic surgery team at Hutt DHB is a clinical unit in a speciality where there is some 
national leadership from a smaller DHB.
6 Commission on Competitive and Sustainable Terms and Conditions of Employment for 
Senior Medical and Dental Officers Employed by District Health Boards 2009.
7 Report of L.W. Cook et al. for ANGOA (the Association of Non-governmental Organisations of 
Aotearoa).
8 Whether these services are undertaken by a newly-created entity or purchased from other 
providers is not considered here.
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